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 1
1 Introduction 
The subject of the thesis is a comparison between Norwegian and English contract law. The 
comparison will focus on duties to disclose information when entering into contract, i.e. 
before the parties are in an actual contractual relationship with each other. 
1.1 Objective 
The main objective of the thesis is to identify the differences between the two legal systems 
in relation to the pre-contractual duty to disclose information.  
1.2 Methodology/Delimitations 
The objective will be reached by independent examination of first the rules imposing a duty 
to disclose information in Norwegian law and then the rules imposing a duty to disclose 
information in English law. After examining the rules I will identify the differences 
between the application of the duties in Norwegian and English law respectively.  
 
Considering the limitations in size imposed to this thesis it has been necessary to perform 
certain delimitations.  
 
First, the scope of the thesis is limited to commercial contract. The intention by this is to 
limit the discussions to contracts where both parties can be considered professional actors, 
in opposite of contracts where one party is a consumer. This excludes discussions of 
statutes primarily imposing a consumer protection. 
 
Second, only consequences flowing directly from the pre-contractual duties to disclose 
information will be discussed. This means that the ordinary remedies for breach of contract, 
i.e. damages occurring after entering into contract, will not be discussed.    
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1.3 Definitions 
The background for imposing a duty to disclose information between the parties to a 
contract is somewhat different in the two legal systems. In Norwegian law the Norwegian 
term opplysningsplikt can easiest be translated into the term duty to inform. English law has 
adopted the term duty of disclosure. To simplify the possibility of referring between 
English and Norwegian law I have chosen to adopt a common term, namely duty to provide 
information.  
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2 Norwegian Contract Law 
Under this head will be discussed rules connected to duty to disclose information (3.1) and 
duty of examination (3.2) under Norwegian contract law. 
2.1 Duty to disclose information 
2.1.1 Introduction 
The objective under this head is to identify whether there are rules imposing a duty to 
disclose information in Norwegian contract law. The general rule is held to be that there is 
no duty to disclose information in Norwegian contract law. 1 This rule is based on a 
common contractual understanding that each party to a contract holds the risk of their own 
expectations and assumptions.2 However, there are exceptions to the general rule so that 
there will be certain circumstances where a duty to disclose information will arise. The 
duty may be explicitly imposed by statute in connection with particular types of contracts, 
or it may be implied by the application of the rules enacted in the Norwegian Contract Act 
section 33. In addition the duty to disclose information may arise from the application of 
un-enacted principles imposing a duty of loyalty between parties entering into contract with 
each other.   
 
In the following I will first discuss certain statutes explicitly imposing a duty to disclose 
information in subsection 2.1.2. Then I will discuss whether a duty to disclose information 
may arise from application of the rules enacted in The Norwegian Contract Act section 33 
in subsection 2.1.3, or by application of the un-enacted duty of loyalty in contract in 
subsection 2.1.4. Finally I will discuss the requirement for level fault to be held liable for 
                                                
1 Nazarian (2007) p. 359. 
2 See also Hagstrøm (2002) p. 141. 
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breach of duty to provide information in subsection 2.1.5 and the consequences of breach 
of a duty to disclose information in subsection 2.1.6.  
2.1.2 Duty to disclose information imposed by statute 
In this section of the thesis I will discuss a selection of statutes explicitly imposing a duty 
to disclose information. There are statutes in Norwegian law regulating certain contract 
types. Hagstrøm identifies typical contract legislation to include The Norwegian Sale of 
Property Act3, The Norwegian House-building Contract Act4, The Norwegian Craftsman 
Services Act5, and The Norwegian Home Rental Act.6 Rules imposing a duty to disclose 
information exist in all the mentioned statutes. Most of the mentioned statutes will however 
fall outside the scope of this thesis due to their focus of consumer protection according to 
the delimitations in the main introduction. There are nevertheless other statutes falling 
within the scope. In the following I have chosen, and will therefore discuss, the rules 
imposing a duty to disclose information enacted in The Norwegian Insurance Contract Act7 
in subsection 2.1.2.1, The Norwegian Sale of Property Act in subsection 2.1.2.2, and The 
Norwegian Sale of Goods Act8 in subsection 2.1.2.3. I have elected to discuss these three 
statutes as they may be applicable to commercial contracts, and also represent examples for 
situations where the legislator has chosen to enact a duty to disclose upon the parties 
entering into contract.  
2.1.2.1 The Insurance Contract Act 
In this subsection I will discuss the rules enacted in the Norwegian Insurance Contract Act. 
The act imposes duties to disclose information both on the insurer and to the person 
effecting the insurance. It is however important to note that it is possible to agree upon 
                                                
3 Lov 1992-07-03 nr 93: Lov om avhending av fast eigedom. 
4 Lov 1997-06-13 nr 43: Lov om avtalar med forbrukar om oppføring av ny bustad m.m. 
5 Lov 1989-06-16 nr 63: Lov om håndverkertjenester m.m. for forbrukere. 
6 Hagstrøm (2002) p. 135.  
7 Lov 1989-06-16 nr 69: Lov om forsikringsavtaler 
8 Lov 1988.05-13 nr 27: Lov om kjøp 
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deviating rules in certain commercial insurance contracts. Section 1-3, subsection 2 of the 
act identifies the circumstances allowing for agreed deviation from the rules enacted.    
 
The first rule imposing a duty of disclosure is found in chapter 2 of the act under the 
heading the duty to disclose information by the insurer. Section 2-1 reads:  
In connection with the effecting of an insurance the insurer shall, to a 
necessary extent, make sure the circumstances are such so the person effecting the 
insurance can evaluate the insurance offer. This includes providing information 
whether there are considerable limitations in the coverage of the insurance 
compared to what the insured reasonably can expect to be covered by the insurance 
to be effected, whether there are alternative means of coverage and of extra 
coverage marketed by the insurer. If the effecting concerns several insurances the 
premium for each and one of them should be informed.   
If the parties are not free to choose which country’s legislation will be 
covering the agreement, the insurer is bound to inform which legislation is actually 
covering the agreement. If the parties are free to choose legislation, the insurer 
shall inform which legislation he suggests for covering the agreement. In addition 
the company shall inform about the rules for bringing disputes to a tribunal.   
 
This section imposes a general duty on the insurer to disclose information about the 
coverage and the exclusions of the insurance in discussion.9 The scope of the duty is clear 
from the detailed composition of the act. The reason for such a detailed composition must 
be to make sure the person effecting the insurance is provided with all the information 
necessary to make a sound decision on whether to effect the insurance. 
 
Next, there are rules imposing a duty to disclose information in chapter four of the act 
under the heading general conditions for the liability of the insurer. Section 4-1 reads:  
                                                
9 Brynildsen (2001) p. 36. 
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In connection with effecting or renewing a contract for insurance the 
insurer is entitled to ask for information which might be of important significance in 
the evaluation of risk. The person effecting the insurance shall give correct and 
complete answers to the questions asked. The person effecting the insurance shall 
also unsolicited provide information which he or she must understand is of 
important significance in the insurer’s evaluation of the risk.  
If the person effecting the insurance becomes aware that the information 
given about the risk is wrong or incomplete he shall without ungrounded delay 
inform the insurer.   
 
This section imposes a duty to disclose information on the person effecting the insurance, 
and describes the scope of the duty.10 Brynildsen argues it is important both for the insurer 
and for the person effecting the insurance that the facts the risks are calculated from are 
complete and correct.11 Brynildsen also identifies that the main rule is that there is normally 
no independent duty to disclose information imposed on the person effecting the insurance. 
Instead the insurer has been given the possibility to ask questions about circumstances 
relevant for the insurance to be effected. The person effecting the insurance simply has a 
duty to “give correct an complete answers.”12 The independent duty to disclose information 
imposed to the person effecting the insurance only occurs in relation to information “of 
important significance” for the insurer in calculating the risk. In addition to the requirement 
for the information to be of “important significance”, the person effecting the insurance 
“must understand” that the information is of such importance.13 An example for 
information being “of important significance” is according to Brynildsen a situation where 
there probability for disburse under the insurance in close proximity of time is high.14 
 
                                                
10 Brynildsen (2001) p. 65. 
11 l.c. 
12 ibid. p. 67. 
13 ibid. p. 68. 
14 l.c. 
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The requirement “must understand” indicates that positive knowledge is not necessary, 
gross negligence is sufficient.15 This will be discussed further below under section 2.1.5.  
 
 
The consequences of breach of the rules in the Norwegian Insurance Contract Act will be 
discussed below under section 2.1.6. 
2.1.2.2 The Sale of Property Act 
In this subsection I will discuss the rules imposing a duty to disclose information in the 
Norwegian Sale of Property Act. The act imposes a duty to disclose information on the 
vendor. Similar to as for The Norwegian Insurance Contract Act it is possible to agree to 
deviate from the rules enacted. This is evident from section 1-2 subsection 1 of the act.  
 
The rule imposing a duty to disclose information is found in section 3-7 of the act. 
Simonsen introduces the following translation of the section:  
“The property has a defect if the purchaser has not been informed about 
conditions which the seller knew of or could not have been unaware of, and of 
which the purchaser had reason to believe that he should have been informed. This, 
however, is only relevant if one could assume that the non-provision of information 
has influenced the contract.”16  
 
Three conditions for imposing a duty to disclose information can be identified in this 
section of the act. The first requirement is connected to the knowledge of the vendor, the 
second requirement is connected to the expectancy of disclosure of the information, and the 
third requirement is “that the non-provision of information has influenced the contract”.  
 
The requirement for knowledge by the vendor has in Simonsen’s translation been defined 
by the formulation “knew of” or “could not have been unaware of.” A direct translation of 
                                                
15 l.c. 
16 Mistake, Fraud and Duties to Inform in European Contract Law (2005) p. 215. 
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the last requirement would however read “must have known”.  The formulation “knew of” 
seems quite clear, and indicates a positive actual knowledge. The formulation “could not 
have been unaware of”, or “must have known”, does however require further attention. In 
the preparatory documents for the Norwegian Sale of Property Act17  it is held that the 
meaning is there must be no reasonable ground for ignorance. Krüger argues that this 
definition does not make sense as it indicates should have known would be sufficient to 
fulfil the requirement.18 Krüger instead introduces the understanding of expected 
knowledge as incorporated in CISG 1980.19 Selvig holds that the duty to disclose 
information does not cover circumstances the vendor should have knowledge about when it 
cannot be expected that he actually had the knowledge.20 The Supreme Court of Norway 
has not given a clear definition of the expression in connection with cases on contract law. 
However the expressions “must have been aware of” and “must have known” are present in 
other statutes which have been interpreted by the court. In the Supreme Court of Norway 
Case published in RT 1978 page 321 it is held that the normal understanding of the term 
should be adopted. This indicates that normal judgment would deem the ignorance 
incomprehensible. Simonsen’s translation above seems to have taken this interpretation 
into consideration.          
 
The requirement of expectancy of disclosure is connected to the sort of information the 
buyer could expect to be disclosed. This is obviously closely related to the requirement that 
“the non-provision of information must have influenced the contract”. Selvig holds that 
information to be disclosed is information about circumstances usually being of 
significance for the buyer to make a decision on whether to buy and for evaluation of price 
to pay.21  Based in court decisions he identifies examples related to unpleasant odours, 
leaks and moisture, as well as noise from neighbouring properties. Bergsåker argues the 
                                                
17 Ot. Prp. Nr. 66 (1990-1991) 
18 Krüger (2004) 
19 l.c. 
20 Selvig (2001) p. 423. 
21 l.c. 
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scope of the duty to disclose information is quite wide and in addition to the examples 
above also covers development plans for the neighbourhood both by private persons and by 
public authorities as well as practical information about the usage of equipment being part 
of the property.22 Furthermore specific historical circumstances concerning the property 
may be subject to a duty to disclose information. 
 
The consequences of breach of duty to disclose information imposed by this section of the 
Norwegian Sale of Property Act will be discussed below under section 2.1.6.     
2.1.2.3 The Sale of Goods Act 
In this subsection I will discuss the rules enacted in the Norwegian Sale of Goods Act. The 
act imposes a duty to disclose information on the vendor in certain circumstances. Similar 
to the Norwegian Insurance Contract Act and the Norwegian Sale of Property Act 
discussed above, the rules enacted in the Norwegian Sale of Goods Act may be deviated 
from by agreement. This follows from section 3 of the act. Martinussen does however 
argue that the duty to disclose information maintains also in contracts otherwise qualifying 
for deviation from the rules of the act by agreement.23  
 
The rule imposing a duty to disclose information is found section 19 subsection one, 
alternative b) under the heading “Items sold “as is” and items sold on auction”. Subsection 
one alternative b) of the act reads:  
(1) Even though an item is sold “as is” or with similar common 
reservations, there is a defect on the item when: 
b) the vendor has failed to disclose information about essential  
circumstances with the item or the use of the item which the vendor must 
have known and that the buyer had reasons to expect would be given to him, 
provided that the failure to disclose information can be expected to have 
induced the buyer in buying,  
                                                
22 Bergsåker (1997) p. 178. 
23 Martinussen (2001) p. 186. 
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The three same requirements identified in relation to the rules in the Norwegian Sale of 
Property Act above can be identified also for the rule in the Norwegian Sale of Goods Act. 
There are requirements for knowledge, expectancy and inducement.  
 
The requirement of knowledge in my translation of the act is identified by the term must 
have known. The term is the same as introduced in the Norwegian Sale of Property Act 
discussed above in section 2.1.2.2. The scope of the term must therefore be understood to 
be similar.24    
 
The scope of the duty to disclose information is connected to the term “essential 
circumstances”. The evaluation for what being considered “essential circumstances” must 
be seen in relation to the requirement of inducement. Martinussen says essential 
circumstances necessary to disclose may for instance be that a car has been in a collision. 25 
 
The duty to disclose information is not mentioned elsewhere in the Norwegian Sale of 
Goods Act, indicating there is no explicit general duty to disclose information is contracts 
for the sale of goods.26 The rule in section 19 of the Norwegian Sale of Goods Act cannot 
be understood to be a general rule. There is a limitation present in the application of this 
section of the act. It only covers items sold “as is” or with other similar reservations. This is 
a traditional “as is” clause intending to limit the liability of the vendor. The vendor is 
however not able to eliminate liability for damages he “must have known”. 27  Selvig holds 
that the common rules imposing a duty to disclose information must apply also to contracts 
for the sale of goods despite the lack of a general rule in the act.28 The common rules 
                                                
24 See also Martinussen (2001) p. 185 – 186. 
25 ibid. p. 185. 
26 Selvig (2001) p. 174. 
27 Stordrange (1995) p. 21. 
28 Selvig, op.cit., p. 174. 
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imposing a duty to disclose information will be discussed below in section 2.1.3 and 
section 2.1.4. 
 
    
The level of fault necessary to be held liable for breach of duty to disclose information and 
the consequences of breach will be discussed commonly in section 2.1.5 and 2.1.6 below. 
2.1.3 Duty to disclose information arising from application of the rules in The 
Norwegian Contract Act, section 33 
In this section I will discuss whether a duty of information can be implied by the rules 
enacted in section 33 of the Norwegian Contract Act and the scope of such a duty. 
2.1.3.1 Introduction 
Simonsen introduces the following translation of section 33 of the Norwegian Contract 
Act:  
“Even if a declaration of intention otherwise had to be regarded as valid, it 
does not bind the person who has given it, if, owing to circumstances present when 
the other party received knowledge of the declaration and which it must be assumed 
that he knew of, it would be contrary to decency and good faith, if he claimed the 
declaration.”29 
 
The rule in section 33 of The Norwegian Contract Act implies nullity if it would be deemed 
indecent to claim the declaration considering the circumstances present.30  Woxholth 
argues the principle of freedom in contract indicates that contracts can be entered into 
without hindrances and with simplicity. However if a party to a contract is behaving 
indecent in relation to another party he should not be able to profit from the freedom of the 
principle.31    
                                                
29 See Mistake, Fraud and Duties to Inform in European Contract Law (2005)  p. 153.  
30 Woxholth (2001) p. 324. 
31 ibid. p. 325. 
 12
 
Woxholth furthermore holds that the rule in section 33 of the act does not clearly define 
what circumstances are being deemed null, and identifies the rule to be an umbrella section 
covering and supplying other rules imposing nullity.32  
In the following I will discuss whether it is possible to identify a duty to disclose 
information based on the rules enacted in section 33 of the act in subsection 2.1.3.2 below. 
Furthermore I will identify the scope of the duty to disclose information in subsection 
2.1.3.3 below.  
 
The level of fault necessary to be liable for breach of a duty to disclose information and the 
consequences of breach will be discussed commonly in section 2.1.5 and 2.1.6 below.  
2.1.3.2 Identification of the duty to disclose information 
Clearly section 33 of the Norwegian Contract Act does not explicitly mention a duty to 
disclose information. As mentioned above the section does however identify conditions for 
nullifying a declaration of intention. Three cumulative conditions leading to nullification 
can be identified. First, certain “circumstances” must be present, second, the receiver of the 
declaration “must be assumed” to know the circumstances, and third, it must be considered 
“contrary to decency and good faith to claim the declaration”. The question is whether the 
existence of a duty to disclose information can be identified from interpreting these three 
conditions. 
 
The first condition identified deals with circumstances. Woxholth says “circumstances” can 
be most everything.33 The essential matter is whether not revealing the circumstance is 
considered contrary to decency and good faith. This will be discussed below. According to 
Hagstrøm the most important circumstance potentially causing nullity is connected to the 
delusion of the person giving his declaration of intention.34 The delusion can be based in a 
                                                
32 Woxholth (2001) p. 325. 
33 l.c.  
34 Hagstrøm (2003) p. 141. 
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misunderstanding or in lack of knowledge. Hagstrøm furthermore claims it is necessary 
that the delusion must have induced the contract.35 I will discuss inducement below in 
section 2.1.3.3. 
 
The second condition identified deals with knowledge. The essential here is whether the 
receiver of the declaration knew about the circumstance. Woxholth holds that the wording 
of the act implies that only actual positive knowledge of the circumstance fulfils the 
requirement of knowledge.36 Whether the knowledge of the delusion should cause the 
declaration to be null depends in turn on whether it would be considered “contrary to 
decency and good faith” to claim the declaration valid.37 If it can be considered “contrary 
to decency and good faith”, Hagstrøm argues the receiver of the declaration would have a 
duty to provide the information to eliminate the delusion.38   
 
The third condition is that it must be “contrary to decency and good faith to claim the 
declaration.” Considering the identifications made above, this condition seems to be of 
essential significance. The question to be answered is then what is considered to be 
“contrary to decency and good faith”. Simonsen argues that “what might be contrary to 
‘honest behaviour and good faith’ has to be determined after a concrete evaluation of the 
particular circumstances at the time of the formation of the contract.”39 Woxholth claims 
the expression “good faith” has limited or no independent significance in this matter.40 The 
essential evaluation is therefore what lays in the expression “decency”. Woxholth stresses 
that the evaluation should be objective.41 It seems difficult to set a general standard for 
                                                
35 Hagstrøm (2003) p. 141. 
36 Woxholth (2005) p. 337. 
37 Hagstrøm, op. cit., p. 136. 
38 l.c. 
39 Mistake, Fraud and Duties to Inform in European Contract Law (2005) p. 153. 
40 Woxholth, op. cit., p. 336. 
41 l.c. 
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decency, instead particular characteristics of a transaction may indicate the standard to be 
adopted.  
 
Recapitulating the identifications made above it seems that the application of the rules in 
the Norwegian Contract Act section 33 may in certain circumstances sum up to the 
existence of a duty to disclose information. The existence of the duty is however subject to 
an independent evaluation of whether it would be “contrary to decency and good faith” not 
to disclose the information.   
2.1.3.3 Scope of the duty to disclose information 
Under this subsection I will discuss the scope of the duty to disclose information, meaning 
an identification of what information must be disclosed. In my understanding the 
identification of what information being subject to a duty of disclosure is nearly connected 
to the requirement “contrary to decency and good faith” discussed above in section 2.1.3.2. 
The reason for this understanding is that the standard of decency may indicate what 
information being necessary to disclose in the particular circumstance. The requirements of 
“circumstances” and knowledge is nevertheless relevant also to identify the scope of the 
duty. 
 
Firstly, the duty is connected to circumstances. Woxholth holds that the term circumstances 
as used in section 33 of the act only covers facts.42 This is identified as an opposite to 
hypotheses. Woxholth acknowledges that the border between facts and hypotheses may not 
always be clear, and argues the core of the matter therefore is whether it would be deemed 
indecent to claim the declaration.43 Based in the requirement for decency Hagstrøm says 
that the creditor is entitled to the information he had reasons to expect being disclosed.44 
He continues acknowledging that the scope of the duty to disclose information therefore 
will be based on complex evaluations. Factors identified to be evaluated are the knowledge 
                                                
42 Woxholth (2001) p. 334. 
43 l.c. 
44 Hagstrøm (2003) p. 142. 
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and positions of the parties, relevant and important information about the performance of 
the contract, whether there are any significant privileges or obligations connected to the 
contract item, and whether lawful authorities have imposed limitations to the usage of the 
contract item.45 Woxholth claims that the duty of disclosure anyway generally can be said 
to be extensive in relations where one party has been trusted with tasks by another, for 
instance agents and lawyers, and where the parties are in a familiar or friendly relationship 
with another.46   
 
As mentioned above Hagstrøm claims a necessity for inducement.47 In connection with 
breach of duty to disclose information this means that the lack of information, or the 
incorrect understanding of the circumstance, must have been important in the decision to 
declare intention. According to Hagstrøm the requirement for inducement indicates that 
only essential information is subject to the duty to be disclosed, based on an assumption 
that only essential information has the potential of inducing.48 The requirement for 
inducement may in my opinion also be a factor in the evaluation of what sort of 
information needs to be disclosed.   
 
Even though it seems like it is not possible to specifically identify a general rule for what 
information being necessary to disclose and what information not being necessary to 
disclose, the factors identified by Hagstrøm above must be understood to be of essential 
value in the determination of whether the person receiving the declaration is bound by a 
duty to disclose information.  
                                                
45 Hagstrøm (2003) p. 142 – 148. 
46 Woxholth (2001) p. 336. 
47 Hagstrøm op. cit. p. 141. 
48 Hagstrøm op. cit. p. 142. 
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2.1.4 Duty to disclose information imposed by application of the doctrine of loyalty 
in contract 
In this section I will discuss whether a duty of information can be implied by the rules 
imposed by an un-enacted duty of loyalty in contract.  
2.1.4.1 Introduction 
According to Woxholth the parties to a contract are understood to be bound by a general 
duty of loyalty towards each other.49 Hagstrøm argues that the Norwegian courts have 
defined increasingly more stringent duties based in this principle of loyalty over the years. 
50 The Supreme Court of Norway applies the duty in the case publicised in RT 1988 page 
1078. Judge Gjølstad states that there is a duty of loyalty in contract that requires the 
parties to a contract to act with care and loyalty. Furthermore this duty of care and loyalty 
maintains throughout the entire course of the contract.  
 
In the following I will discuss whether it is possible to identify a duty to disclose 
information based on the rules imposed by the un-enacted duty of loyalty in contract in 
subsection 2.1.4.2 below. Furthermore I will identify the scope of the duty to disclose 
information in subsection 2.1.4.3 below.  
 
The level of fault necessary to be liable for breach of a duty to disclose information and the 
consequences of breach will be discussed commonly in section 2.1.5 and 2.1.6 below.    
2.1.4.2 Identification of the duty to disclose information 
Nazarian holds that a duty to disclose information may arise from statutes and from 
application of the rules in the Norwegian Contract Act section 33, and also based in the un-
enacted principles of duty of loyalty in contract. 51 According to Woxholth it has been held 
in theory that a contract can be deemed null if a party to the contract acts with disloyalty 
                                                
49 Woxholth (2001) p. 338. 
50 Hagstrøm (2003) p. 73. 
51 Nazarian (2007) p. 359. 
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towards the other party when entering into the contract.52 The disloyalty must however be 
assumed to be of significance for the other party in entering into the contract.53 In relation 
to a duty to disclose information the vital matter must be whether it can be considered to be 
contrary to the duty of loyalty to withhold the information.54 If holding back information is 
considered disloyal the duty to disclose information must be understood to have been 
breached.  
 
From the discussion above I find it clear that it is possible to identify a duty to disclose 
information based on the rules imposed by the un-enacted duty of loyalty in contract. 
2.1.4.3 Scope of the duty to disclose information 
As mentioned above the essential requirement for a duty to disclose information is that it 
must be considered disloyal to withhold the information. An obvious starting point to 
identify the scope of the duty is therefore to identify the meaning of expression “loyalty”.  
 
It may seem like an interpretation of what is contrary to loyalty will easily also be 
considered indecent in relation to the rules in section 33 of The Norwegian Contract Act 
discussed above. According to Nazarian section 33 of the Norwegian Contract Act may 
actually be considered a codification of the un-enacted duty of loyalty in contract.55 In the 
Supreme Court of Norway case published in RT 1984 page 28 it is nevertheless held that 
the duty of loyalty has an independent significance, and also that the duty of loyalty has a 
wider field of operation than section 33 of The Norwegian Contract Act. Nazarian holds 
that this indicates a more stringent duty of caution based in the un-enacted duty of loyalty 
than what follows form section 33 of the Norwegian Contract Act.56 In the Supreme Court 
                                                
52 Woxholth, op. cit., p. 338. 
53 l.c. 
54 Woxholth (2001) p. 102. 
55 Nazarian (2007) p. 67. 
56 Ibid. p. 102. 
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of Norway case published in RT 1995 page 1460 the majority (four to one) holds that 
stringent requirements concerning the duty of loyalty between the parties are necessary.  
 
The Supreme Court of Norway furthermore holds, in the same case, that the evaluation of 
whether the duty to disclose information is fulfilled must be based on whether knowledge 
would have significance for the decision to enter into the contract, alternatively whether the 
contract would have been entered into on different terms. It is therefore indicated a 
requirement for inducement. In addition the Supreme Court of Norway also ascertain that 
the requirement for knowledge is that the party should have understood the failure to 
disclose information would influence the decision on whether to enter into the contract.  
 
The discussions above makes it clear that the scope of a duty to disclose information 
imposed by the rules in the un-enacted duty of loyalty is somewhat wider than for a duty of 
disclosure imposed by application of the rules in section 33 of The Norwegian Contract 
Act. Whereas the rules in section 33 of The Norwegian Contract Act tends to require a 
disparity between the parties to the contract entered into, the un-enacted duty of loyalty is 
also applicable for contracts where the parties are considered equal. From the discussions 
above it can nevertheless be identified requirements for knowledge and inducement also for 
a duty to disclose information based on the un-enacted duty of loyalty. Woxholth claims it 
is easier for the courts to apply a duty to disclose information to the parties entering into a 
contract with each other based in the un-enacted duty of loyalty than for the court to base 
the duty on the requirement of being contrary to decency in section 33 of The Norwegian 
Contract Act.        
2.1.5 Liability  
In this section I will discuss the level of fault necessary to be established for a party to be 
held liable for breach of duty to disclose information, and in turn also to be liable for 
damages. 
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Woxholth identifies the liability to be connected to whether the reason for nullification is 
considered strong or weak.57 The strong reasons may nullify contracts where a receiver of a 
declaration has acted with attentive good faith.58 The weak reasons may nullify contracts 
where a receiver of a declaration must have acted with either actual knowledge or assumed 
knowledge, indicating at least negligence.59 The rule imposed by section 33 of the contract 
act is considered a weak reason.60 This indicates the main rule for being held liable for 
breach of duty to disclose information should be negligence or wilful conduct.  
Based on the discussions above this concurs with the understanding adopted by The 
Supreme Court of Norway in the case published in RT 1995 page 1460 in relation to duty 
to disclose information imposed by the un-enacted duty of loyalty. The literate 
understanding of section 33 of the Norwegian Contract Act, however, requires that “it must 
be assumed that he knew”. This indicates a positive knowledge is necessary. Hagstrøm 
nevertheless holds that it is commonly accepted in Norway to include circumstances one 
“should be aware of” in relation to the duty to disclose information.61 He furthermore 
stresses that the Supreme Court of Norway has actually applied section 33 of the 
Norwegian Contract Act to negligent behaviour.62  
 
The main rule of negligence or deliberate fault must therefore be understood to define the 
level of fault necessary to be held liable for breach of duty to disclose information imposed 
either by the rules in section 33 of The Norwegian Contract Act or by the rules in the un-
enacted duty of loyalty in contract.   
 
The rules enacted in the Norwegian Insurance Contract Act specifies as discussed above in 
section 2.1.2.1 a requirement for knowledge by the expression “must understand”. This 
                                                
57 Woxholth (2001) p. 304. 
58 l.c. 
59 l.c.  
60 Woxholth (2001) p. 304. 
61 Hagstrøm (2003) p. 150. 
62 See for instance case published in RT 1984 p. 28. 
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requirement is similar to “the must have known” requirement introduced in relation to The 
Norwegian Sale of Property Act and The Norwegian Sale of Goods Act discussed in the 
next paragraph. The same requirements for fault must be understood to be necessary. The 
Norwegian Insurance Contract Act also includes special rules requiring deliberate 
misconduct. These rules will be discussed below in section 2.1.6.3.  
 
The rules enacted in the Norwegian Sale of Property Act specifies as discussed above in 
section 2.1.2.2 a requirement for knowledge by the expression “knew of or could not have 
been unaware of”, or “must have known” . The Norwegian Sale of Goods Act discussed 
above in section 2.1.2.3 involves a similar requirement for knowledge. Martinussen holds 
that the expression “must have known” indicates a level of fault somewhere in between 
negligence and gross negligence.63 This means that regular negligence will not be 
sufficient, while gross negligence clearly is sufficient. 
 
The knowledge of the person being in breach of duty to disclose information is also 
relevant for the liability for damages. Hagstrøm identifies contractual culpa to be the main 
rule.64 He furthermore holds that contractual culpa is similar to negligence in normal tort 
law. Based on the discussion above negligence seems to be the requirement both for being 
held liable for breach of duty to disclose information and for being held liable for damages. 
Exceptions must be present where the enacted duty of disclosure has different requirements 
for knowledge incorporated in the actual statute. In connection with pre-contractual duty to 
disclose information the rule of culpa is identified as culpa in contrahendo.65   
2.1.6 Consequences of breach 
The consequences of breach of duty to disclose information and the remedies available 
depend on the rules from which the duty has been imposed. As mentioned above breach of 
duty to disclose information by the un-enacted duty of loyalty in contract or by the 
                                                
63 Martinussen (2001) p 185. 
64 Hagstrøm (2003) p 452. 
65 Ibid p. 459. 
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Norwegian Contract Act section 33 lead to the contract being deemed null. In connection 
with breach of duty to disclose information where the duty has been imposed explicit by 
statute, the statute often includes regulations defining also the results of breach. In addition 
to nullification of the contract it may be possible to claim damages. 
 
In the following I will discuss the mechanisms connected to nullification of a contract in 
section 2.1.6.1, and also the requirements for claiming damages in section 2.1.6.2. Finally I 
will discuss the particular rules concerning duty to disclose information explicitly imposed 
by statute in section 2.1.6.3.    
2.1.6.1 Nullification of contract due breach of duty to disclose information 
As discussed above, breach of duty to disclose information gives reason to render a 
contract null independent of resulting from application of section 33 of the Norwegian 
Contract Act or the un-enacted duty of loyalty in contract. The contract will nevertheless 
not be rendered null automatically. It is necessary for the party claiming a breach of the 
duty to disclose information to plead the contract null based on application of either set of 
rules.66 If successful Hagstrøm holds that a null contract may give reason for a return of all 
transfers made in the course of contract.67 The general rule is according to Woxholth that 
the contract may be ended, resulting in contractual obligations laid on both the parties loose 
their application.68 If the contract is rendered null before completion of obligation by either 
of the parties, the obligations seize to exist. If the contract is rendered null after completion 
of obligations the main rule is restitution of all completed obligations.69 Hagstrøm argues 
that if the contract is rendered null it implies that the parties are bound by a mutual duty of 
full restitution.70 Although the main rule is full restitution, there are exceptions. Woxholth 
identifies exceptions from the main rule if the contract item has been legally transferred to 
                                                
66 Woxholth (2001) p. 301. 
67 Hagstrøm (2003) p. 672. 
68 Woxholth, op. cit., p. 294. 
69 l.c. 
70 Hagstrøm, op. cit., p. 301. 
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a third person or if the contract item is lost or damaged.71 If the exceptions are present it 
may however be possible to claim damages according to the general rules for damages in 
tort.72 
 
It is important to note that normally the courts will only be able to make decisions covering 
the full contract. Woxholth argues it is not possible do render only parts of the contract 
null.73   
2.1.6.2 Damages for void contracts 
In addition to restitution after pleading a contract void it is also possible to claim damages. 
In the Supreme Court of Norway case published in RT 2002 page 1120 it was held that it 
can be awarded damages for loss and expenses being a direct result from entering into the 
contract in connection with void contracts. The general conditions for claiming damages in 
Norwegian law must be assumed to apply. This means it is necessary to prove an actual 
economical loss, liability for the loss, adequacy and finally a causal connection.74 The 
requirement of causal connection is however somewhat modified in connection with 
contract law. It is necessary to distinguish between positive and negative expectation 
interests.75 The positive expectation interest is based on the assumption of the position of 
the parties had the contract been completed satisfactory, and includes losses caused by the 
contract. The negative expectation interest is based on the assumption of the position of the 
parties if the contract was not entered into, and includes expenses in connection with the 
contract.76 In connection with a void contract, in which restitution is a result, application of 
the negative expectation interests must be the standard.77 In the following I will discuss 
these four mentioned conditions in relation to void contracts due breach of duty to disclose 
                                                
71 Woxholth, op. cit., p. 294 – 295. 
72 ibid.  p. 295. 
73 Woxholth (2001) p. 303. 
74 Hagstrøm (2003) p. 519. 
75 l.c. 
76 Hagstrøm. op. cit. p. 520 – 521. 
77 ibid. p. 521. 
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information. The requirement of economical loss and the negative expectation interest will 
be discussed together. The requirement for liability was discussed above in section 2.1.5. 
 
Firstly it is an absolute requirement for claiming an award for damages that there has been 
an economical loss.78 The requirement of economical loss is nearly connected to the 
requirement of causal connection because the causal connection will identify which 
expenses that may be covered by an award for damages. As mentioned above the causal 
connection in relation to void contracts will be that of negative expectation interests. The 
negative expectation interest usually includes different categories of expenses.79 Hagstrøm 
identifies four categories.80 The first category is negotiation fees and expenses. This 
includes expenses in preparing offers, expenses for lawyers and consultants, and other 
expenses occurring before contract is entered into. The second category is contract 
expenses. This includes expenses arising from the actual entering into contract, and 
includes documentation fees and provisions. The third category is fulfilment expenses. This 
includes the expenses necessary to fulfil the contractual obligations. The fourth category is 
expenses in connection with lost employment. This includes loss in connection with not 
entering into other obligations in trust of the fulfilment of the contract entered into being 
fulfilled. The essential characteristics four all these expenses are that they have occurred 
because the party trusted the contract would be fulfilled.81    
 
Next, the requirement for adequacy must be fulfilled. This involves that the loss must be 
considered foreseeable.82 In the Supreme Court of Norway case published in RT 1983 page 
205 the following definition for adequacy of the loss was adopted: It must be a reasonable 
close connection to the breach, the loss must not be too distant, a derivative or 
                                                
78 Hagstrøm. (2003)  p 535. 
79 ibid. p. 521. 
80 ibid. p. 521 – 522.  
81 ibid. p. 522. 
82 ibid. p. 526. 
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unforeseeable.83 The understanding of what is considered adequate may therefore be 
subject to an independent evaluation based on circumstances around the particular contract 
and the parties to the particular contract. Consequential loss however, is according to 
Hagstrøm always considered foreseeable.84  
2.1.6.3 Particular consequences of breach of duty to disclose information explicitly 
imposed by statute 
2.1.6.3.1 The Norwegian Insurance Contract Act 
In this subsection I will discuss the particular consequences following from breach of duty 
to disclose information imposed by The Norwegian Insurance Contract Act. 
 
Section 4-2 in the Norwegian Insurance Contract Act includes rules concerning the breach 
of duty to disclose information imposed by the rules of the act discussed in section 2.1.2.1 
above. The section reads: 
If the insured fraudulent has failed to fulfil the duty to disclose information 
according to section 4-1 of this act, and a circumstance releasing a claim by the 
insurance, the insurer has no liability towards the insured.   
If the insured otherwise than fraudulent has failed to fulfil the duty to 
disclose information, and he cannot alone be held responsible, the liability held by 
the insurer may be limited or waived.   
In decisions based on subsection two of this act it shall be taken into 
consideration what consequences the failure has had for the insurer’s evaluation of 
the risk, the fault of the insured, the damage and other circumstances. 
 
In this section of the act there can be identified two different levels of breach. Subsection 
one requires fraudulent behaviour, or wilful conduct, as mentioned in section 2.1.5. above. 
Subsection two covers all other breach than fraudulent. It is important to note that the rules 
                                                
83 See RT 1983 page 205 at page 221. 
84 Hagstrøm (2003) p. 543. 
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in this section are applicable only if a claim has been released in respect to the coverage of 
the insurance. In relation to the requirement for knowledge discussed in section 2.1.2.1 
above, fraudulent behaviour means that the person effecting the insurance wilfully has 
given incomplete or incorrect information with the intention of getting better terms than 
what would be available if based on correct and complete information.85 If the breach of 
duty to disclose information is found to be fraudulent the insurer has no liability to disburse 
claims in connection with the insurance agreement in matter.86 Brynildsen holds that the 
burden of proof imposed on the insurer in connection with claimed fraudulent behaviour is 
very stringent.87 
 
If fraudulent behaviour cannot be proved, section two of the act applies. The insurer is 
given the possibility to limit or waive disbursement of claims. Section three of the act 
identifies the factors to be considered in the evaluation of whether the disbursement of 
claims should be limited or waived.   
 
There are further rules identifying consequences of breach of duty to disclose information 
in section 4-3 of the act. Section 4-3 reads:  
If the insurer gains knowledge to that the information he has been given 
about the risk is incorrect or incomplete in essential parts, the insurer may cancel 
the insurance by 14 days notice. Section 3-7 subsection two is applied similarly. If 
the insured has acted fraudulent, the insurer may cancel the actual insurance and 
others held with immediate effect.   
 
This section is applicable if the insurer gains knowledge that the information given by the 
person effecting the insurance was incorrect or incomplete without the need of a claim 
being made by the insured. The insurer is in such circumstances entitled to cancel the 
insurance. If the insured has acted fraudulent according to the criteria discussed in the 
                                                
85 Brynildsen (2001) p 70. 
86 ibid. p 73. 
87 ibid. p. 72. 
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paragraph regarding section 4-2 of the act, the insurer may cancel the insurance with 
immediate effect. If fraudulent act cannot be proved the insurance may be cancel by 14 
days notice.  
Based on the discussion above it seems like the normal rules concerning breach of duty to 
disclose information must be understood to be unavailable for breaches in connection with 
contracts for insurance. If the insurer has suffered a loss it is assumable possible for the 
insurer to sue for damages in tort. 
2.1.6.3.2  The Norwegian Sale of Property Act 
In this subsection I will discuss the particular consequences following from breach of duty 
to disclose information imposed by The Norwegian Sale of Property Act. 
 
Section 3-7 of the act discussed above in section 2.1.2.2 clearly states that “the property has 
a defect” if there has been a breach of duty to disclose information.  
 
The available remedies for defects in relation to contracts for the sale of property are 
enacted in the sections 4-8 through to 4-16 of the act. Defects in contract will fall outside 
the scope of this thesis according to the delimitations in the main introduction.  
2.1.6.3.3 The Norwegian Sale of Goods Act 
In this subsection I will discuss the particular consequences following from breach of duty 
to disclose information imposed by The Norwegian Sale of Goods Act. 
 
Section 19 subsection one of the act discussed in section 2.1.2.3 above clearly states that 
“there is a defect” if the duty to disclose information imposed by alternative b) of the 
section has been breached.  
 
The available remedies for defects in relation to contracts for the sale of goods are enacted 
in the sections 30 through to 40 of the act. Defects in contract will fall outside the scope of 
this thesis according to the delimitations in the main introduction. 
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3 English Contract Law 
Under this head will be discussed the rules connected to duty to disclose information (3.1) 
and duty of examination (3.2) under English contract law. 
3.1 Duty to provide information 
In the first part of this section of the thesis I will concentrate on the identification and 
discussion of the rules concerning the duty to provide information under English contract 
law. 
3.1.1 Introduction 
The objective under this head is to identify whether there exists a general duty to provide 
information between parties entering into contract in English contract law. According to 
Beatson88 “the general rule of the common law is that a person contemplating entering a 
contract with another is under no duty to disclose information to that other.” This 
understanding is also the understanding applied and expressed by the House of Lords in the 
case Bell v. Lever Bros. Ltd.89 in which Lord Atkin submits that “[o]rdinarily the failure to 
disclose a material fact which might influence the mind of a prudent contractor does not 
give the right to avoid the contract.” Turner90 however approves the general rule, but 
argues that even though there usually will be no obligation to disclose information there are 
“specific types of transaction and relation” where the law imposes a duty to disclose all 
facts. These “specific types of transaction and relation” will be discussed below in 
subsection 3.1.2. 
Furthermore Turner identifies that there is a general duty of truthfulness in “all transactions 
and relations known to the law.” A deviation from this “general duty of truthfulness” may 
in certain circumstances lead to a misrepresentation being made. The concept of 
misrepresentation is in my understanding nearly related to the disclosure of information 
and will be discussed below in subsection 3.1.3 
                                                
88 Beatson (2002) p. 236 
89 Bell v. Lever Bros. Ltd. [1932] A.C. 161 
90 Turner (1990) p. 3. 
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Acknowledging that there is no general duty to disclose information in English contract 
law, the following discussion will concentrate on the above mentioned exceptions where a 
duty to disclose information is being imposed. Furthermore I will also discuss the rules 
concerning misrepresentation.     
3.1.2 Duty to disclose information 
3.1.2.1 Introduction 
Acknowledging the fact stated above that the general rule of English contract law is that 
there is no duty to disclose information, there are certain exceptions. These exceptions are 
connected to transactions where the nature of the transaction itself gives origin to a duty to 
disclose information, and transactions where the relationship between the parties generates 
a duty to disclose information. Based on these two conditions Turner identifies four groups 
of situations where a duty to disclose information is imposed.91 The four groups are; duty 
to disclose information in contracts uberrimae fidei, duty to disclose information in relation 
to court, tribunal or state agency, duty to disclose information in relations of confidence, 
and duty to disclose information in relations of influence or advantage.  
 
In the following I will first define the scope of the duty to disclose information, and then 
continue to discuss the groups of situations mentioned above.    
3.1.2.2 The duty to disclose information defined 
3.1.2.2.1 “Disclosure” 
Firstly, when discussing a duty to disclose information it is important to identify what is 
meant by the word disclosure itself in the context of contract law. The word disclosure is to 
be understood as the communication of existing facts and past events.  
3.1.2.2.2 “Legal basis” 
                                                
91 See Turner (1990) p. 5. 
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Secondly, the legal basis from which the duty to disclose information arises must be 
identified. As the duty to disclose information arises before the contract is actually entered 
into, the duty to disclose information can obviously not arise out of the contract itself.92 In 
the Court of Appeal case of Joel v. Law Union and Crown Insurance Co.93 Lord Justice 
Fletcher Moulton states that providing information “is merely the fulfilment of a duty - it is 
not contractual”. In March Cabaret Club & Casino, Ltd. v. London Assurance, Ltd94 Justice 
May identifies the situations where the duty to disclose information is implied and says 
“…the duty to disclose is not based on an implied term in the contract at all; it arises 
outside the contract, and applies to all contracts uberrimae fidei, and is not limited to 
insurance contracts; it also applies, for instance, to contracts of surety, certain family 
settlement contracts, and other similar types of contractual relationship.” 
 
3.1.2.2.3 “Facts and past events” 
The scope of the terms “existing facts and past events” mentioned above seems to be wide. 
According to Turner the term “fact, or “circumstance”, includes “any event or thing, 
present or past; and the present or past qualities, attributes, state, condition, and incidents, 
of any such event or thing.”95   
3.1.2.2.4 “Materiality” 
Furthermore the duty to disclose information can only be implied to facts and 
circumstances which are material in the particular case. Turner identifies the general rule to 
be that “[a]ny fact or circumstance is deemed material to be disclosed which if disclosed 
would on a fair consideration of the evidence have influenced a reasonable prudent person 
as to whether to enter into the transaction contemplated or in deciding upon its terms, 
having regard to the class and character of the transaction contemplated.” 96 This is the 
                                                
92 See Turner (1990) p. 18. 
93 Joel v. Law Union and Crown Insurance Co. [1908] 2 K.B. 863, C.A. 
94 March Cabaret Club & Casino, Ltd. v. London Assurance, Ltd. [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 169. 
95 Turner, op. cit., p. 27. 
96 ibid, p. 32. 
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same rule for materiality adopted by the majority in the House of Lords case Pan Atlantic 
Co. Ltd. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd.97 There is also a requirement for materiality that 
there is a logical connection between the fact and the nature of the “transactions to which 
the proposed transaction belongs.”98 This means that it is sufficient for the logical 
connection to be established that there is a general logical connection between the fact and 
transactions of the same nature as the proposed transaction. It is not necessary that the 
logical connection is established with the actual proposed transaction.    
3.1.2.2.5 “Inducement” 
Although the fact is considered material to the transaction, it is not necessary that the fact 
has actually induced the transaction.99 It is enough that the materiality has been proven in 
accordance with the definition discussed above.  
3.1.2.2.6 “Knowledge” 
The fact or circumstance in matter is furthermore subject to the knowledge of the parties. In 
the Court of Appeal case Joel v. Law Union and Crown Insurance Co.100 Lord Justice 
Fletcher Moulton that “[t]he duty is a duty to disclose, and you cannot disclose what you do 
not know.” This sets out the general rule for the duty of the party who normally would be 
under the obligation to provide information. Knowledge may however be actual or 
presumptive.101 As for actual knowledge Turner argues it is the knowledge “shown to have 
been personally, and not vicariously, known to the person to whom it is attributed, and 
actually present to his mind at the material date.”102  The definition of presumptive 
knowledge is somewhat wider. Turner103 divides presumptive knowledge into five 
categories identified as (1) knowledge of facts of public notoriety, (2) facts the party should 
                                                
97 Pan Atlantic Co. Ltd. V. Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd. [1995] 1 AC 501. 
98 Turner (1990) p. 33-34. 
99 Ibid. p. 36. 
100 Joel v. Law Union and Crown Insurance Co. [1908] 2 K.B. 863. 
101 See Turner, op. cit. p. 50. 
102 ibid. p. 55. 
103 l.c. 
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have knowledge about in the course of his business, (3) facts subject to actual knowledge 
by an agent, (4) facts being a natural extension of facts of actual knowledge, and (5) 
presumed knowledge by law. 
 
The facts of public notoriety include facts considered to be normally known, also general 
rules of the law. Facts the party should have knowledge about in the course of his business 
includes special knowledge peculiar to the business held. Facts subject to actual knowledge 
by an agent is according to general rules of agency considered to be the knowledge of the 
principal. There are off course exceptions to this general rule, but the scope of this work 
does not allow for a discussion on the law of agency. I do not consider the two last 
categories to need further explanation.104    
3.1.2.2.7 “Exact and complete, Explicit and unambiguous” 
The next requirement by law is that the disclosure is “exact, complete, explicit and 
unambiguous.” 105 If the disclosure does not fulfil these requirements no disclosure is 
considered to have been made. The requirements are meant to provide that the facts 
disclosed cannot be misunderstood.    
3.1.2.3 The situations where a duty to disclose information is imposed 
3.1.2.3.1 “Duty to disclose information in contracts Uberrimae Fidei” 
The contracts falling in under the term uberrimae fidei is the largest group of contracts 
where a duty to disclose information is imposed. The duty to disclose information in 
contracts uberrimae fidei arises because of the “nature of the contract being negotiated”.106 
The term uberrimae fidei means “of the utmost good faith”, distinguished from “bona 
fidei”-good faith. The prime example of contracts uberrimae fidei is insurance contracts. 
Traditionally this group of contracts also includes contracts for family settlements such as 
contracts to marriage and separation deeds. Contracts for the sale of land, contracts of 
                                                
104 For further reading on the subject see Turner (1990) p 56 – 82. 
105 ibid p. 20. 
106 See Turner (1990) p. 85. 
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suretyship, releases and compromises, and contracts for partnership are sometimes treated 
as they belong to the group of contracts uberrimae fidei, but the correct view is that they 
are not.107 These contracts will however sometimes be subject to a duty to disclose 
information imposed by tests similar to those of contracts uberrimae fidei. I will discuss the 
situations where the duty to disclose information is imposed to these contracts below. Other 
contracts in which “the particular circumstances of the case lay a duty to disclose 
information upon those negotiating for them” may as well sometimes be treated as 
contracts uberrimae fidei.108 The essential peculiarity of the contracts uberrimae fidei is that 
one of the parties to the contract negotiated has exclusive knowledge being material to the 
proposed transaction. Furthermore the disclosure of such knowledge must be expected to 
influence the judgement in entering the contract and negotiating its terms.109  
 
The foundation for imposing a positive duty to disclose information in contracts uberrimae 
fidei is originally understood to be “mercantile custom”. In Fletcher v. Krell110 Justice 
Blackburn states that “[m]ercantile custom has established the rule with regard to 
concealment of material facts in policies of insurance, but in other cases there must be an 
allegation of moral guilt or fraud.”   In the House of Lords case Bell v. Lever Bros., Ltd111 
Lord Thankerton refers to Justice Blackburn’s statement and continues to identify further 
exceptions to the general rule, which does not impose “a duty to disclose all material facts 
on formation of a contract”, “in cases of trustee and cestui que trust and of a company 
issuing a prospectus and an applicant for shares.”112 Turner holds that the duty has been 
firmly established, and the rule imposing the duty may be referred to as the “doctrine of 
                                                
107 See Poole (2006) a, p. 526. 
108 Turner. (1990) p.89. 
109 l.c. see also Beatson (2002) p. 264 and Poole, op. cit., p. 525. 
110 Fletcher v. Krell [1872] 28 L.T. 105. 
111 Bell v. Lever Bros., Ltd. [1932] A.C. 161. 
112 Bell v. Lever Bros., Ltd. [1932] A.C. 161. on p. 231-232 
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uberrimae fides”113. Turner furthermore argues that without a duty to disclose information 
in contracts uberrimae fidei “the parties cannot be placed upon equal terms.” 
 
Contracts of insurance have been identified as the prime example for contracts uberrimae 
fidei. In Rozanes v. Bowen114 Lord Justice Scrutton says “it has been for centuries in 
England the law that in connection with insurances of all sorts, marine, fire, life, guarantee, 
and every kind of policy, that as the underwriter knows nothing, and the man who comes to 
him to ask him to insure knows everything, it is the duty of the assured, the man who 
desires to have a Policy, to make a full disclosure to the underwriters, without being asked, 
of all the material circumstances.” This duty to disclose information is imposed by statute 
in The Marine Insurance Act 1906, sections 17-19. The duty formulated in The Marine 
Insurance Act 1906 is however not limited to marine insurance, but applies to all classes of 
insurance.115 This become clear in March Cabaret Club and Casino, Ltd. v. London 
Assurance, Ltd.116 in which Justice May states that “[a]lthough by that statute that principle 
is applicable only to marine insurance, it is quite clear from a large number of 
authorities…” “… that it applies to non-marine insurance as well.”  
 
Even though the party applying for insurance will be likely to be the party with exclusive 
knowledge in the majority of the cases, the duty to disclose information is mutual. The 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 section 17 imposes the duty to “either party”. Likewise in 
Banque Keyser Ullmann S.A. v. Skandia (U.K.) Insurance Co., Ltd.,117 in which Justice 
Steyn says that “reciprocal duties of the utmost good faith are owed to one another by an 
insured and an insurer.” 
 
                                                
113 See Turner (1990)  p. 92. 
114 Rozane v. Bowen [1928] 32 L1. L. Rep. 98 
115 Turner, op. cit.., p. 98. 
116 March Cabaret Club and Casino, Ltd. v. London Assurance, Ltd., [1975] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 169. 
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When it comes to contracts for the sale of land it is disputed in later legal theory whether 
the doctrine of uberrima fides applies at all. This is mainly due to the remedies available for 
breach in these types of contracts. I will discuss the remedies below. Earlier theory 
however concludes the duty to disclose information in contracts in the sale of land is 
absolute. 118 
 
To the extent there is a duty to disclose information, it is necessary to distinguish between 
disclosure of defects in title and disclosure of defects in quality.119 The duty to disclose 
information is only imposed to defects in title. Defects in quality are handled by other 
mechanisms in the law of contract. Defects in title can be divided into four subsections. 
The first is when the vendor has no title to the property, or substantial parts of the property, 
being sold, the second when the property is materially different from what the purchaser 
could expect from the contract, the third when there are encumbrances on the property, and 
the fourth when lawful authorities have affected the vendor’s title by order or notice.120 
Peculiar to contracts for the sale of land, in opposite of the rule in insurance contracts, only 
the vendor will be under a duty to disclose information imposed by the doctrine of 
uberrima fides, not the buyer.121 Although this duty to disclose information is argued to be 
absolute, the aspect of knowledge is to be considered. According to the principles discussed 
above, the doctrine of uberrimae fides cannot impose a duty to disclose information of 
information the vendor did not have knowledge of.122  
 
Contracts of suretyship are the third type of contracts which traditionally have been 
classified to fall under the description of contracts uberrimae fidei. As I will demonstrate 
below this classification is subject to modifications. A contract of suretyship is a contract 
where a person, called the surety, enters into contract with another, the creditor, to take the 
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responsibility of possible future breach of obligations of a third person, the debtor.123 There 
are three different types of contracts falling in under the description of contract of 
suretyship. The first is a contract guaranteeing a cash obligation, the second is a contract 
guaranteeing fidelity, and the third is contracts guaranteeing for performance of a 
transaction. The most common are the contracts guaranteeing cash obligations. These 
typically include guaranteeing the payment of debts.    
 
As mentioned above the classification of contracts of suretyship as a contract uberrimae 
fidei may be somewhat modified. It is argued the contracts of suretyship are not at all a 
contract uberrimae fidei. However the contracts of suretyship include some aspects typical 
to contracts uberrimae fidei, hence I discuss it under this head. The general conditions for 
imposing a duty to disclose information as discussed above are not all present in contracts 
of suretyship. The duty to disclose information only extends to facts and circumstances the 
surety would naturally expect not to exist.124  In Hamilton v. Watson125 Lord Campbell 
formulated the rule governing duty to disclose information in contracts of suretyship. He 
defined the test for imposing a duty to disclose information as “whether there is anything 
that might not naturally be expected to take place between the parties who are concerned in 
the transaction that is, whether there be a contract between the debtor and the creditor, to 
the effect that his position shall be different from that which the surety might naturally 
expect.”  Lord Campbell also exemplified the rule by identifying any secret agreement or 
understanding between the creditor and debtor to subject to a duty to disclose information. 
The general condition of full disclosure of all material facts is therefore not necessary.  
 
Contracts for family settlements do not fall within the scope of this work and will not be 
discussed further. Furthermore the relevancy of including contracts for family settlements 
has disappeared with the enactment of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
                                                
123 See Turner (1990) p. 151. 
124 See ibid. p. 158. 
125 Hamilton v. Watson [1845], 12 Cl.  Fin. 109. 
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1970126, section 1 (1) where it is decided that contracts to marry “shall not under the law of 
England and Wales have effect as a contract giving rise to legal rights and no action shall 
lie in England and Wales for breach of such an agreement, whatever the law applicable to 
the agreement.”  
3.1.2.3.2 “Duty to disclose information in relation to courts and other third persons” 
Concealment from courts and other third persons does not fall within the scope of pre-
contractual duty to disclose information and will therefore not be discussed further. 
However I do consider it relevant to mention that there are situations in connection with 
contracts where a duty to disclose information in respect of courts, public authorities and 
third persons may arise.127 
3.1.2.3.3  “Duty to disclose information in relations of confidence” 
The duty to disclose information in relations of confidence arises from the nature between 
the parties to a contract, parties said to be in a fiduciary relationship.128 There is no exact 
legal definition for what is meant by a fiduciary. However it is connected to the meaning of 
the word, namely trust. The distinct characteristic of a fiduciary relationship is that one 
party has a duty to act in the interest of another.129 Fiduciary relationships fall into two 
different categories, identified as those based on status and those based on facts.130 The first 
category, based on status, includes the relationships of principal and agent, solicitor and 
client, guardian and ward, and trustee and beneficiary. The duty to disclose information 
here arises for instance to information the agent gains knowledge about which must be 
deemed to be information the principal is entitled to. In such a relationship the duty of the 
fiduciary is “simply to disclose information acquired” when representing the principal.131 If 
                                                
126 Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1970. 
127 For further reading on this subject, see Turner (1990) p. 275 – 296. 
128 ibid. p. 303. 
129 Beatson (2002) p. 228. 
130 l.c. 
131 See Turner, op. cit., p. 314. 
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the fiduciary fails to forward the information to his principal he is in breach of the duty to 
disclose information under the rules fiduciary relationships.    
 
The second category is based on a particular relation between the parties not based in 
status. Instead it is related to the facts which a party may have or gain knowledge of in a 
particular event. Furthermore the relationship between the parties must otherwise resemble 
that of a fiduciary relationship in terms of including the particular characteristics of such a 
relationship. This includes for instance isolated situations where friends, family or others 
are in a position to provide special advice or support to a friend or a family member and 
therefore act on behalf of the other. Because of the special relationship in this matters the 
“the fiduciary is expected to take all due care on behalf of the principal.”132  
 
3.1.2.3.4 “Duty to disclose information in relations of influence and advantage” 
The final group of situations where a duty to disclose information may be imposed are 
those where it exists a relation of influence or advantage between the parties. Generally 
defined these are situations where one party can be said to be “the stronger party” and one 
can be said to be “the weaker party”.133 These relationships fall outside the scope of this 
work and will not be discussed further.134  
3.1.2.4 Consequences of breach 
Bearing in mind the fact mentioned above that the duty to disclose information is not a part 
of the contract itself it seems the remedies normally available for breach of contract should 
not be available for breach of duty to disclose information. Turner holds that the only 
available remedy is the avoidance of the contract.135 This point of view is confirmed in the 
case Glasgow Assurance Corporation v. Symondson & Co136, in which Justice Scrutton 
                                                
132 See Turner (1990) p 314. 
133 ibid. p 515. 
134 For further reading see ibid. p 515 – 727. 
135 ibid. p. 19. 
136 Glasgow Assurance Corporation v. Symondson & Co. [1911] 104 L.T. 254. 
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says “non-disclosure is not a breach of a contract giving rise to damages, but a ground for 
avoiding the contract.” This constitutes the general rule. There are however exceptions if 
the non-disclosure is really a fraudulent concealment of fact, or if the non-disclosure 
otherwise involves aspects of fraud, which off course entitles an award for damages in 
fraud.137 Conditions for the remedies of avoidance of the contract in form of rescission and 
conditions for damages in fraud are the same for non-disclosure as for misrepresentation.138 
The conditions for these remedies will be discussed below under the head of 
misrepresentations. 
                                                
137 See Turner (1990) p. 250. 
138 See ibid. p. 252. 
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3.1.3 Misrepresentation 
3.1.3.1 Introduction 
Having established that there is no general duty to disclose information in English contract 
law, and having discussed the exceptions in English contract law where a duty to disclose 
information is actually imposed, I am now continuing to discuss a neighbouring topic, the 
one of misrepresentations. The reason why I am incorporating a discussion on 
misrepresentation in connection with duties to disclose information is that I feel the duty to 
provide correct information to be nearly connected and a natural extension to the discussion 
on duty to disclose information. In the following I will therefore discuss the conditions for 
claiming misrepresentation, the sources of law and the remedies available. 
3.1.3.2 Misrepresentation defined 
When discussing the rules concerning misrepresentation it is necessary to first understand 
what is actually meant by a representation. A representation under English contract law is 
defined as “a statement of fact made by one person to another which influences that other 
in making a contract with the representor, but which is not necessarily a term of that 
contract.”139 If the statement proves to be wrong it is called a misrepresentation. By the 
definition three requirements can be identified which all must be met if a statement is to be 
considered a representation. The first requirement is that there must be “a statement of 
fact”, the second is that the statement is “made by one person to another”, and the third is 
that the statement “influences that other in making a contract”. I will discuss these three 
requirements below. 
                                                
139 Whincup (2001) p. 277. 
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3.1.3.2.1 “Statement of fact” 
The requirement for a “statement of fact” actually includes two requirements. It must be an 
actual statement and it must concern a fact. The term “statement” is understood simply to 
be “a positive assertion”.140 The term has not been interpreted strictly by the courts. In the 
Court of Appeal case of Curtis v. Chemical Cleaning & Dyeing Co. Ltd.141 Lord Denning 
says that “any behaviour, by words or conduct, is sufficient to be a misrepresentation if it is 
such as to mislead the other party.” This indicates that it is not necessary with an oral 
expression to be made. Behaviour such as a confirming nod or a wink in connection with a 
question asked will therefore be considered a statement.142 Silence however can never 
constitute a misrepresentation.143 This also follows from the fact discussed above that there 
is no general duty to disclose information in English contract law.144     
The term “fact” basically indicates that it must be possible to prove it either right or 
wrong.145 This means that in general it must be possible to test the rightfulness of the 
statement. It is suggested that the requirement of testability excludes expressions made in 
advertisements and in sale talks.146 For the same reason opinions usually cannot lead to a 
misrepresentation being made. This becomes clear in the Privy Council case of Bisset v. 
Wilkinson147 in which Lord Merrivale says that it is “essential to ascertain whether that 
which is relied upon is a representation of a specific fact, or a statement of opinion, since 
an erroneous opinion stated by the party affirming the contract, though it may have been 
relied upon and have induced the part of the party who seeks rescission, gives no title to 
relief unless fraud is established.”  
 
                                                
140 Whincup (2001) p. 278. 
141 Curtis v. Chemical Cleaning & Dyeing Co. Ltd. [1951] 1 K.B. 805 
142 Whincup. op. cit., p. 280. 
143 l.c. 
144 See Poole (2006) a, p. 522. 
145 See Whincup op. cit., p. 278. 
146 l.c.  
147 Bisset v. Wilkinson. [1927] AC 177 
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Closely connected to opinions are statements of intentions or promises of future events. 
Failure to fulfil such intentions or promises can normally not constitute a 
misrepresentation. The exception is off course if the person has no intention at all to do 
what he or she claims to be intending.148   
 
There is furthermore a requirement that the statement of fact constituting the representation 
must be unambiguous.149 In the interpretation of the ambiguity of the statement the 
reasonable understanding of the statement given should be adopted. This means it is 
necessary to interpret how the statement would normally be understood. 150 The result of 
such an interpretation entails that an unreasonable interpretation of the representation by 
the representee can not lead to a misrepresentation having been made. This understanding 
was also adopted by the Court of Appeal in McInerny v. Lloyds Bank Ltd.151   
 
When discussing misrepresentation it is necessary to make an additional extension to the 
general definition of representations. For misrepresentations it is also a requirement that the 
statement is proved false. The term “false” is subject to an evaluation of the degree of 
falseness.152 Theory suggests a broad understanding of the term. This means it should be 
assessed whether the statement given is “substantially correct”. This definition has become 
the one used to set the standard for evaluating whether representations in connection with 
marine insurance contracts are true, and is enacted in The Marine Insurance Act 1906153, 
section 20 (4). The same understanding was also adopted by the Court of Appeal in Avon 
Insurance plc. v. Swire Fraser Ltd.154  
3.1.3.2.2  “made by one person to another” 
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The next requirement for defining a representation is that it must have been “made by one 
person to another.” This requirement includes an indication that the statement must actually 
have been made by the representor and “addressed to the party mislead”. This 
understanding was applied by the House of Lords in the case Peek v. Gurney.155   
3.1.3.2.3 “Influences that other in making a contract” 
The final requirement is that the statement “influences that other in making a contract”, 
also defined as a requirement for inducement to enter into contract.156 In the House of Lord 
case Pan Atlantic Co. Ltd. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd.157 it was established it is 
necessary to establish both inducement and materiality. The test of materiality adopted by 
the majority in this case is the same as discussed above under the head of duty to disclose 
information, namely that it must have “influenced a reasonable prudent person” to enter 
into the contract. This House of Lords judgement changed the earlier general understanding 
that it was not necessary to establish materiality in cases of misrepresentation. Before this 
judgment it was held established inducement was sufficient.158   
 
Incorporated in the requirement of inducement lays the intention of the representor that the 
statement should be acted upon and also that the representee actually must have acted upon 
the statement. 159 Although there is a requirement of inducement it is not necessary that the 
statement alone gives the reason for entering into contract, nor is it necessary that the 
statement is the main reason. The statement must however have been of significant 
influence on the decision to enter into contract.160  
                                                
155 Peek v. Gurney [1873] L.R. 6 H.L. 377. 
156 See Poole (2006) a, p. 529. 
157 Pan Atlantic Co. Ltd. v. Pine Top Insurance Co. Ltd. [1995] 1 AC 501. 
158 See for instance Museprime Properties Ltd. v. Adhill Properties Ltd. [1990] 36 EG 114 
159 See Poole op. cit., p. 529. 
160 See Whincup (2001) p. 282 – 283.  
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3.1.3.3 Categories of Misrepresentation 
Having discussed the general conditions to be met for a misrepresentation to be claimed, I 
will now continue to discuss the particular circumstances for different categories of 
misrepresentation. The categories of misrepresentation are connected to the person making 
a misrepresentation and his state of mind, e.g. fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent 
misrepresentation and innocent misrepresentation.161 I will also discuss the rules imposed 
in the Misrepresentation Act 1967. Establishing the differences in the mind of the 
representor is important in evaluating the remedies available as will be discussed below. 
3.1.3.3.1 Fraudulent Misrepresentation 
A misrepresentation is considered fraudulent when the representor knows the statement 
given is wrong.162 The definition of fraud was defined by the House of Lords in the case 
Derry v. Peek163 in which Lord Herschell says “fraud is proven when it is shown that a 
false representation is made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) 
recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.” Lord Herschell continues the speech stating 
that “if fraud be proved, the motive of the person guilty of it is immaterial.”   
3.1.3.3.2 Negligent Misrepresentation 
A misrepresentation is considered negligent if the representor did not know the statement 
given was wrong, but however could and should have been aware that the statement given 
was incorrect.164 The authority defining negligent misrepresentation is found in the Court 
of Appeal case Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Mardon165 in which Lord Denning says that “if a 
man, who has or professes to have special knowledge or skill, makes a representation by 
virtue thereof to another – be it advice, information or opinion – with the intention of 
inducing him to enter into a contract with him, he is under a duty to use reasonable care to 
                                                
161 See Beatson (2002) p. 243. 
162 See Whincup (2001) p. 284. 
163 Derry v. Peek [1889] 14 App Cas 337. 
164 See Whincup op. cit., p 284. 
165 Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. V. Mardon [1976] QB 801. 
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see that the representation is correct, and that the advice, information or opinion is 
reliable.” Liability for negligent misrepresentation by statute is discussed below.  
3.1.3.3.3 Innocent Misrepresentation 
A misrepresentation is considered innocent if the representor believed that the wrongful 
statement given was true, and can prove that the belief of truthfulness was reasonable 
grounded.166 Rules concerning both negligent and innocent misrepresentations are imposed 
by the Misrepresentation Act 1967 discussed below. 
3.1.3.3.4 Misrepresentation Act 1967 
The Misrepresentation Act 1967 includes rules for what remedies are available for 
negligent and innocent misrepresentation. Section 2 (1) defines the remedies available for 
negligent misrepresentations, and section 2 (2) defines the remedies available for innocent 
misrepresentations.  
3.1.3.4 Consequences of breach 
In the following I will discuss the remedies available for misrepresentation and duty of 
disclosure. The remedies available depend on how the representation has been interpreted. 
In certain circumstances the representation may be of great importance to the contract so 
that the representation has actually become a term, implied or express, to the contract.167 If 
the representation has become a term of the contract, the misrepresentation will be treated 
as a breach of contract with all the normal contractual remedies available. Breach of terms 
will not be discussed in this work.  
 
If the representation however only was an inducement it is not considered breach of 
contract and will be governed by a different set of rules. Only remedies available for 
misrepresentations not considered to have become terms of the contract will be discussed 
below. The remedies available furthermore depend on the type of misrepresentation being 
                                                
166 See Poole (2006) a, p. 539. 
167 See Whincup (2001) p. 283. 
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made, fraudulent, negligent or innocent. For fraudulent misrepresentations the remedies 
available are laid down by the House of Lords in the case Derry v. Peek168 in which Lord 
Herschell says that “[f]raud gives rise to liability for damages for the tort of deceit and/or 
the right to rescind the voidable contract.” For negligent misrepresentations the available 
remedies are laid down by the Misrepresentation Act 1967 section 2 (1) in which it is stated 
that “if the person making the misrepresentation would be liable to damages in respect 
thereof had the misrepresentation been made fraudulently, that person shall be so liable 
notwithstanding that the misrepresentation was not made fraudulently.” This indicates that 
the remedies available for fraudulent misrepresentations are also available for negligent 
misrepresentations. Exception exists in the act if the representor “proves that he had 
reasonable ground to believe and did believe up to the time the contract was made the facts 
represented were true.” This also defines how to distinguish between negligent and 
innocent misrepresentations. For innocent misrepresentation the primary remedy is the 
right to rescind the contract.169 However the introduction of the Misrepresentation Act 1967 
introduced a possibility for granting damages also for innocent misrepresentations. This 
indicates that the remedies available for innocent misrepresentation will either be rescission 
or damages. In addition it is possible to be granted an indemnity for innocent 
misrepresentation.170 In the following I will discuss the remedies rescission, damages and 
indemnities.  
 
As mentioned above under the head of remedies for breach of duties of disclosure, the 
remedies available for such breaches are rescission and damages where fraud is present. 
The following discussion on conditions for application of the remedies of rescission and the 
award for damages in fraud will therefore concern both breach of duty to disclose 
information and misrepresentations.   
3.1.3.4.1 Rescission 
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Rescission is an equitable remedy. As discussed above the remedy of rescission is available 
for all the different types of misrepresentation, e.g. fraudulent, negligent and innocent. 
Rescission means that the contract is set aside or declared ended, and furthermore that the 
positions of the parties are restored to how they were before the contract was entered 
into.171  Rescission therefore relieves the parties from any obligation or duty agreed to in 
the contract.   
 
Although available for all types of misrepresentation, the right to rescind the contract is not 
absolute. Under certain circumstances the representee may loose the right to rescind. These 
circumstances are in connection with affirmation or acceptance, lapse of time, if restitution 
is impossible, if third party interests intervene, and finally if conditions in the 
Misrepresentation Act 1967 have been met.   
 
The first circumstance where the right to rescind the contract may be lost is connected to 
affirmation or acceptance. This exception occurs when the representee knows that the 
representation made was wrong and still gives indications to the representor that he or she 
or she wishes to continue the contract.172 The authority for this exception is the Court of 
Appeal case of Long v. Lloyd173 in which Lord Justice Pearce says after recapitulating the 
facts of the case that “all events, appears to us to have amounted … to a final acceptance … 
for better or for worse, and to have conclusively extinguished any right of rescission 
remaining…”  
 
The second circumstance where the right to rescind may be lost involves the lapse of time. 
The rule here is that the possibility to rescind the contract is lost after a certain amount of 
time. In the Court of Appeal case Leaf v. International Galleries174 Lord Justice Denning 
applies the same test to lost right to rescind du lapse of time as was enacted for when the 
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right to reject is lost due lapse of time in The Sale of Goods Act 1893. This indicates that 
“reasonable time” should be the standard. Defining what is meant by the expression 
“reasonable time” Lord Justice Denning says “[h]e had ample opportunity for examination 
in the first few days after he had bought it. Then was the time to see if the condition or 
representation was fulfilled.” The time in which the “reasonable time” will run from 
depends on the sort of misrepresentation made. If the misrepresentation made was 
fraudulent the time starts running when the fraud was discovered, or when the fraud 
reasonably could have been discovered. If the misrepresentation was innocent or negligent 
the time starts running from the date of contract.175          
 
The third circumstance is when restitution is deemed impossible. This principle is 
sometimes referred to by the Latin expression restitutio in integrum. The rule is defined by 
Queen’s Bench in the case Clarke v. Dickinson176 , a case of sales of shares in a mining 
company, in which Justice Erle says “the plaintiff cannot avoid the contract under which he 
took the shares, because he cannot restore them in the same state as when he took them.” 
The application of the rule is described by the Chancery Division in the case Thomas Witter 
v. TBP Industries Ltd.177 in which Justice Jacob talks about rescission and says “[t]his 
remedy is not available where it is not possible to restore the parties to their position before 
the contract.”  It is furthermore not possible to rescind only parts of a contract. This 
understanding is introduced by the Queen’s Bench in the case De Molestina v. Ponton178 in 
which Justice Colman says “[t]here can be no doubt that, according to the present state of 
development of English law, this court is bound by the general principle that the 
misrepresentee is permitted to rescind the whole of a contract but not part of it.” He 
continues to declare that “[t]his has been recognised as well established since the 
eighteenth century.” 
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177 Thomas Witter v. TBP Industries Ltd. [1996] 2 All ER 573. 
178 De Molestina v. Ponton [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 587. 
 48
The existence of third-party interests may also extinguish the right to claim rescission.179 
The rule is defined by the Court of Appeal in the case Lewis v. Averay.180 In which Lord 
Denning says that “the contract is voidable, that is, liable to be set aside at the instance of 
the mistaken person, so long as he does so before third parties have in good faith acquired 
the rights under it.” The way I see it the result of lost right to rescind in this context also 
follows as a result of the restitutio in integrum rule discussed above. It is not possible to 
“restore the parties to their position before the contract” if the ownership of the subject of 
the contract has legally passed over to a third person in good faith.    
 
Finally there are certain rules enacted in the Misrepresentation Act 1967 which may lead to 
the right of rescission being lost.  In section 2 (2) of the act it is stated that “the court or 
arbitrator may declare the contract subsisting and award damages in lieu of rescission.” 
3.1.3.4.2 Damages for misrepresentation 
Traditionally damages for misrepresentation have only been available if the 
misrepresentation was fraudulent. Turner stresses that before 1963 it was a “significant 
difference” between fraudulent and non-fraudulent misrepresentations.181 For fraudulent 
misrepresentations it was possible both to rescind the contract and to sue for damages. For 
non-fraudulent misrepresentations only rescission was possible. Turner identifies the 
“distinction between common law and equity” to be the reason for this difference.182 In 
1964 the House of Lords gave a judgement changing the rules in respect of non-fraudulent 
misrepresentations. I will discuss that judgement below.  
 
For an action for damages in fraud to be successful it is necessary that the description of 
fraud applied by the House of Lords in the case Derry v. Peek183 discussed above is met. 
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The burden of proof lies on the one suing for damages.184 If fraud is proved the next step is 
to consider the measure for damages. In the House of Lord case Smith New Court 
Securities Ltd v. Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset Management) Ltd185 Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
presents four points defining the measures for damages. “First, that the measure of damages 
where a contract has been induced by fraudulent misrepresentation is reparation for all the 
actual damage directly flowing from entering into the transaction. Second, that in assessing 
such damages it is not an inflexible rule that the plaintiff must bring into account the value 
as at the transaction date of the asset acquired: although the point is not adverted to in the 
judgements, the basis on which the damages were computed shows that there can be 
circumstances in which it is proper to require a defendant only to bring into the account the 
actual proceeds of the asset provided that he has acted reasonably in retaining it. Third, 
damages for deceit are not limited to those that were reasonably foreseeable. Fourth, the 
damages recoverable can include consequential loss suffered by reason of having acquired 
the asset.” A slight limitation to the wide measures is present in the speech of Lord Justice 
Winn in the Court of Appeal case Doyle v. Olby (Ironmonger) Ltd.186 where he says the 
liability is limited to “all the damage flowing from the tortuous act of fraudulent 
inducement which was not rendered too remote…”  
 
As mentioned above damages were traditionally not available for negligent 
misrepresentations. The first change of circumstances came in 1964 with the House of 
Lords case Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd.187 in which Lord Morris of 
Borth-Y-Gest said: “My lords, I consider that it follows and that it should now be regarded 
as settled that if someone possessed of a special skill undertakes, quite irrespective of 
contract, to apply that skill for the assistance of another person who relies upon such a skill, 
a duty of care will arise.” This “duty of care” implied a liability making it possible to claim 
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damages also for negligent misrepresentations in fiduciary relationships.188  The standard 
was applied by the Court of Appeal in the case Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Mardon189 in 
which Lord Denning says that someone who “… negligently gives unsound advice or 
misleading information or expresses an erroneous opinion, and thereby induces the other 
side to enter into a contract with him, he is liable in damages …” The measure of damages 
however is not as wide as identified above in connection with fraudulent misrepresentation. 
In the mentioned Court of Appeal case Lord Denning holds that one “should look into the 
future as to forecast what would have been likely to happen if he had never entered into this 
contract: and contrast it with his position as it is now as a result of entering into it.” This 
indicates that only a foreseeable loss is recoverable in opposite of in connection with 
fraudulent misrepresentations where unforeseeable loss also will be covered. It is important 
to notice that similar to action for damages where misrepresentation is fraudulent, the 
burden of proof still lays on the person claiming damages.190    
 
Another change of circumstances in respect of award for damages for negligent 
misrepresentations came with the introduction of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. The rules 
imposed by section 2 (1) of the act place fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation on an 
equal footing. This entails a construction of fraud seeming to entitle damages for all loss, as 
would be the case with proved fraudulent misrepresentation. This means a wider measure 
for damages than would be the result under the common law rules discussed above. In the 
Court of Appeal case Royscot Trust Ltd. v. Rogerson191 Lord Justice Balcombe confirms 
this understanding by saying “the finance company is entitled to recover all the losses 
which it suffered as a result of its entering into the agreements with the dealer and the 
customer, even if those losses were unforeseeable.” The burden of proof is however 
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opposite by the rules imposed by the act. Instead of the person claiming damages having to 
prove negligence, the person who made the misrepresentation must prove “that he had 
reasonable ground to believe and did believe up to the time the contract was made the facts 
represented were true.”    
 
In connection with innocent misrepresentation the granting of award for damages is limited 
to the situations where damages are granted instead of rescission according to the rules 
enacted in the Misrepresentation Act 1967 section 2 (2). 
3.1.3.4.3 Indemnities 
For innocent representation it is also possible for the courts to grant an award for 
indemnities. Indemnities somewhat resembles damages, but it does not cover as widely as 
damages will. The width of what loss indemnities will cover was defined in the Court of 
Appeal case Newbigging v. Adam.192 Lord Justice Bowen here says “that when you are 
dealing with innocent misrepresentations you must understand that proposition that he is to 
be replaced in status quo with this limitation – that he is not to be replaced in exactly the 
same position in all respects, otherwise he would be entitled to recover damages, but is to 
be replaced in his position so far as regards the rights and obligations which have been 
created by the contract into which he has been induced to enter.”193  
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4 Comparative conclusions 
Under this head I will identify the differences between the rules imposing a duty to disclose 
information under Norwegian law and under English law. The discussion below is based on 
my identifications and my opinions. The application and the basis for the duty to provide 
information will be discussed in section 4.1, and the consequences of breach of the duty to 
inform will be discussed in section 4.2. The following identifications will be based on the 
discussion in sections 2 and 3 above. 
4.1 On duty to disclose information 
As identified in section 2.1.1 above the general rule in Norwegian law is held to be that 
there is no duty do disclose information. Likewise in section 3.1.1 above it is argued that 
“the general rule of the common law is that a person contemplating entering a contract with 
another is under no duty to disclose information to that other.” It seems like the contractual 
understanding indicating that the parties are responsible for their own expectations and 
assumption is the general rule in both English and Norwegian contract law. There are 
however identified exceptions imposing a duty to disclose information in both Norwegian 
and English Law. 
 
In section 2.1.1 above it can be identified that in Norwegian law the duty to disclose 
information may arise from different legal bases. The duty may arise explicitly from 
statute, the duty may be implied as a consequence of other rules enacted in the Norwegian 
Contract Act section 33, or it may be identified by the rules in an un-enacted duty of 
loyalty in contract. In English law legal practice has established a duty to disclose 
information in certain types of contracts, as discussed in section 3.1.1 above. Although 
there are certain rules in Norwegian law explicitly imposing a duty of disclosure it seems 
like the application of the rule in section 33 of the Norwegian Contract Act is more 
practical. Application of the rule in section 33 of the act is however based on approximate 
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evaluations specific to each separate situation where a party claims breach of duty to 
disclose information. The common law system in England actually seems more predictable 
to me in this matter, at least when comparing only to a duty to disclose information based 
in the rules in the Norwegian Contract Act section 33.    
 
Both English and Norwegian contract law has developed un-enacted principles indicating 
expected behaviour between the parties. In English contract law it has been identified a 
general duty of truthfulness. Behaviour contrary to the general duty of truthfulness 
typically leads to a misrepresentation being made. In Norwegian law it has been identified 
an un-enacted general duty of loyalty in contract. Behaviour contrary to the duty of loyalty 
may include for instance breach of duty to disclose information. The un-enacted principle 
present in Norwegian law seems to me to have a much wider scope of application.  
 
Certain statutes explicitly imposing a duty to disclose information in Norwegian law has 
similar counterparts in English law. The first statute imposing a duty to disclose 
information in Norwegian law discussed above is The Norwegian Insurance Contract Act. 
The act imposes duties to disclose information on both the insurer and the person effecting 
the insurance. In English contract law the doctrine of uberrima fides identifies certain 
contract types where the duty to disclose information will be imposed. The prime example 
for contracts uberrimae fidei is insurance contracts. The doctrine imposes a duty to disclose 
information on both parties. The Norwegian Insurance Contract act is subject to a 
possibility for deviation from the act if it is a commercial company effecting the insurance. 
The doctrine of uberrima fides seems to be applied without reservations. From my 
understanding a contract of insurance under Norwegian law will still be subject to the 
applications of the rules in section 33 of the Norwegian Contract Act or the un-enacted 
duty of loyalty, even though it has been agreed to deviate from the rules imposed in The 
Norwegian Insurance Contract Act. 
 
The next statute imposing a duty to disclose information in Norwegian law discussed above 
is the Norwegian Sale of Property Act. The vendor is bound by a duty to disclose 
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information considered to be essential for the buyer. In English law contracts for the sale of 
land is sometimes considered to be a kind of contract uberrimae fidei. Even if the contracts 
for the sale of land may not fall within the scope of the doctrine of uberrima fides, there is 
imposed a duty to disclose information in relation to defects in title.  
 
The third statute imposing a duty to disclose information in Norwegian law discussed 
above is the Norwegian Sale of Goods Act. I have not been able to identify similar rules 
concerning contracts for the sale of goods in English contract law. The Norwegian rule 
does anyway have limited application as it applies only to contracts with reservation 
clauses, or “as is” clauses. The general rules for duty to disclose information either by 
application of the Norwegian Contract Act section 33 or the un-enacted duty of loyalty 
understood to apply. Contracts for the sale of goods represent an examples for situations 
where a duty to disclose information will be imposed under Norwegian law but not under 
English law. Therefore I am inclined to think that the duty to disclose information is 
imposed to a wider range of contracts under Norwegian law than under English law. 
 
Although the Norwegian Contract Act section 33 has no explicit rules defining the duty to 
disclose information, it has been identified certain factors being relevant in the evaluation 
of what information being subject to a duty to disclose information. I particularly find 
interest in the fact that the positions of the parties and relationships of trust have been 
identified as factors in the evaluation of the presence of a duty to disclose information. I 
have identified that a duty to disclose information will be imposed to contracts where the 
parties are considered to be in a fiduciary relationship under English law. The examples 
introduced for when someone is in a fiduciary relationship are the same examples 
introduced in connection with relationships of trust in Norwegian law, namely lawyers and 
clients, and agents and principals. 
 
English contract law has extensive rules covering misrepresentation. I have not been able to 
identify a general rule of same extent covering a similar mechanism under Norwegian law. 
There is however a resembling rule, although not discussed in this thesis, present in the 
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Norwegian Contract Act section 30 subsection two. The rule covers fraudulent provision of 
incorrect information from one party to another, and may lead to the contract being deemed 
null. 
4.2 On consequences of breach of duty to inform 
The consequences of breach of duty to disclose information seems to include the same 
mechanisms. In Norwegian law breach may lead to nullification of the contract resulting in 
full restitution to the position held by the parties before entering into contract. This 
mechanism is similar to the remedy of rescission identified in English contract law.  
 
Under Norwegian contract law the main rule for liability leading to the result of nullifying 
the contract is negligence, sometimes moving towards gross negligence. In English contract 
law rescission is a possible result from fraudulent, negligent and innocent behaviour. 
 
Both English and Norwegian contract law allows for a claim for damages in connection 
with nullification/voidance of the contract. The main rule to be liable for damages in 
Norwegian contract law is understood to be negligence. In English contract law 
traditionally only fraudulent behaviour would lead to liability for damages. However, the 
situation changed first in 1963 when also negligent behaviour would lead to liability in 
fiduciary relationships, and then in 1967 with the introduction of the Misrepresentation Act 
where negligent behaviour would be sufficient to be held liable also for non-fiduciary 
relationships.  
 
The measure of damages is identified to be slightly different. In Norwegian contract law 
the measure in connection with breach of duty to disclose information is connected to the 
negative expectation interests. In connection with claim for damages in Norwegian law it is 
a requirement for adequacy. This includes that the loss must be foreseeable. The measure 
for damages in English contract loss is identified to be all loss, also unforeseeable. 
Consequential loss falls within the measure both in Norwegian and English law.  
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According to the requirement for negligence in Norwegian law innocent behaviour or 
behaviour of good faith is identified not to be sufficient to be held liable for damages. 
Under English law it is however possible to be granted a reward for damages also in 
connection with good faith according to the rules in the Misrepresentation Act 1967. 
 
Under English law I also identified the possibility for being granted indemnities in 
connection with rescission after an innocent misrepresentation. I have not been able to 
identify similar rules in Norwegian law. 
5 Closing remarks 
Having discussed the rules concerning duty to disclose information in both Norwegian and 
English contract law I would like to end off with a few closing remarks.  
 
I have made certain observations throughout my work with this thesis on neighbouring 
rules having some relevance for the issues discussed. A thesis allowing for more words 
would off course have room for discussing also these neighbouring rules thoroughly. 
 
An interesting extension on the discussion on duty to disclose information would be a 
discussion on duty of examination. Especially in Norwegian contract law the duty of 
examination have some relevance, at least as a factor being able to limit the duty to disclose 
information.194 
 
Furthermore a discussion on the promissory estoppel under English contract law, and 
whether the estoppel may bar an action for remedies for misrepresentation or breach of 
duty to disclose information.195  
                                                
194 See for example Hagstrøm (2003) p. 331 – 339. 
195 See for example Poole (2006) a, p. 156 – 170. 
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Finally I would like to share a peculiar observation contrary to my expectation before I 
started working on this thesis. I had the impression it would be pronounced differences 
between English and Norwegian contract law in this field. The rules concerning duty to 
disclose information have proved to be surprisingly similar in application and 
consequences.    
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